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Abstract. This paper presents in non-technical language an interpretation of the argument of The General Theory, which is the 
importance of effective demand and its relation to human agency. It argues that The General Theory is not only a treatise on economic 
theory, but also, and more importantly, a treatise on methodology, i.e. how economists should reason when dealing with the complexity 
of the real world. Implicit in this analysis is a distinct position on the remit of the economist and the nature of economic advice and 
policy. This interpretation suggests that this understanding forms a new paradigm of thinking about the economy at large, centred 
around the concept of uncertainty. This insight developed into a new analytical tradition in economics, the Post-Keynesian School 
of economic thought that sees uncertainty and effective demand as the key analytical long-term concepts for understanding how the 
economy evolves through time. 
Keywords: J.M. Keynes; Post Keynesian Analysis; Uncertainty; The General Theory 
JEL codes: B20, B31, B41
[es] El papel de la Teoría General en el canon de economía
Resumen. Este artículo presenta en un lenguaje no técnico una interpretación del argumento de The General Theory, que es el de la 
importancia de la demanda efectiva y su relación con la agencia humana. Abunda en la idea de que The General Theory no es solo 
un tratado sobre teoría económica, sino también, y lo que es más importante, un tratado sobre metodología, es decir, sobre cómo 
los economistas deben razonar cuando tratas la complejidad del mundo real. En este análisis hay implícita una posición sobre las 
competencias de un economista y la naturaleza de la política y asesoramiento económicos. Esta interpretación sugiere que ello forma 
parte de un nuevo paradigma de pensamiento económico, centrado en el concepto de incertidumbre. Esta se convirtió en una nueva 
tradición analítica en economía, la Escuela de pensamiento económico poskeynesiano que considera la incertidumbre y la demanda 
efectiva como los conceptos analíticos clave a largo plazo para comprender cómo evoluciona la economía en el tiempo.
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2 In this paper I use the term “approach” as it is utilised by Harcourt (1987A) who notes that “post-Keynesian economics is a portmanteau term which 
is used to contain the work of a heterogeneous group of economists who nevertheless are united not only by their dislike of mainstream neoclassical 
theory and the IS/LM general equilibrium versions of ‘Keynesian’ theory but also by their attempts to provide coherent alternative approaches to eco-
nomic analysis…. We say ‘approaches’ because several strands can be identified”. (Harcourt, 1987A, p 924) This paper follows a specific interpretative 
line within the diverse school of Post-Keynesian economics, and the theorists that relate with this approach are discussed in section 5 of the paper.
3 There is a large literature of readings popularising Keynes, his life and his message for the non-specialist reader (recent contributions include —not 
a complete list— Cord, 2007; Davidson, 2007; Sheehan, 2009; Clarke, 2009; Skidelsky, 2010; Hayes 2019, and for a variety of introductory rea-
dings on the diverse Keynesian traditions see Repapis, 2014). What is attempted here is to add to this literature by making clearer first the overall 
structure of a specific interpretative tradition of The General Theory and then in explaining the central insight of uncertainty in ways that are diffe-
rent to most of these popularisations. The suggestion, however, is not to argue for only this perspective at the exclusion of all others, as indeed, the 
paper argues in favour of a plurality of approaches of both seeing the economy and in interpreting Keynes’ General Theory. 
1. The General Theory as an alternative approach 
to an understanding of the economy2
Interpretations of The General Theory abound, but 
they usually use technical language or specific mod-
els to make their point and, very rarely discuss in 
some depth what is the unifying vision of the General 
Theory that makes it distinct to the classical and ne-
oclassical perspectives of the economy. At the same 
time simple accounts produced for leisurely reading 
rarely reveal the complexity of the text that makes 
The General Theory defy any simple interpretation.3 
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Therefore, this paper intends to present an account 
of the central unifying theme of The General Theory 
in a non-technical way and introduce key differences 
to classical and neoclassical economics. At the same 
time it can act as a key to re-reading The General 
Theory and reasoning from it anew. This reading fol-
lows a specific interpretative approach of what is the 
main message of the book, and this is discussed in the 
concluding section. 
A good starting point may be to use Lionel Rob-
bins’s definition of economics, which is that econom-
ics is “the science which studies human behaviour as 
a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses” (Robbins, [1932] 1935, 16).4 
The focus of this definition is the idea that modern 
society is defined predominantly by people who have 
enough freedom to make meaningful consumption 
and other important life choices. From this starting 
point, economics develops a technical tool-box that 
analyses these choices, and therefore the way indi-
viduals interact in a variety of institutional environ-
ments. This approach is generally termed neoclassi-
cal, as it emanates from the writings of Stanley Je-
vons, Vilfredo Pareto, Carl Menger, Alfred Marshall 
and Léon Walras, who are the theorists that systema-
tized this individual-based conception of economics, 
and brought it to be the foundation through which to 
analyse the modern economy. It may be useful to call 
this type of economics neoclassical or the ‘econom-
ics of scarcity’, for want of a better shorthand.
There is an older tradition5 that goes back to 
classical political economy, and particularly the 
work of David Ricardo, that focuses on the sub-
stantial productive capacity of the modern capitalist 
economy. David Ricardo in The Principles of Polit-
ical Economy and Taxation (1817) created a system 
that analysed the economy with logical consistency 
but at a high level of abstraction. He was quick to 
observe, that although some rare items —like old 
paintings or fine wines— have their value and price 
determined by their scarcity, they are not what real-
ly forms the main everyday part of market transac-
tions. Thus, he considered these goods not the norm 
in an industrialised society. Instead, what really 
determines value for most things, and therefore is 
the ultimate determinant of price in an industrial-
ised economy, is the cost of production of goods.6 
From this insight, Ricardo proceeds by arguing that 
society is made of different classes, and that “the 
produce of the earth –all that is derived from its sur-
face by the united application of labour, machinery, 
and capital– is divided among three classes of the 
community, namely, the proprietor of the land, the 
4 The definition that ties economics with choice under scarcity is now commonplace in most economics’ textbooks.
5 And there are other perspectives and types of analysis in economics that this paper will not go into, as they are not pertinent to this story.
6 How exactly this cost can be defined is a complex question that, to some degree, still has not received a satisfactory answer- even to those that follow 
this school.
7 Another way to distinguish the two traditions is to call one a (classical) surplus theory, as it focuses on the surplus created over what is needed for 
the reproduction of existing production potential, and the other (marginalist) scarcity theory. This is the terminology used in (Martins, 2014) which 
has a good introduction to the two approaches (see pages 3-34). I refrain from using this terminology here to avoid confusion, as surplus is discussed 
extensively in Section 4.
owner of the stock or capital necessary for its cul-
tivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is 
cultivated” (Ricardo, [1817] 1911, 1). Therefore, 
“to determine the laws which regulate this distribu-
tion is the principal problem in Political Economy” 
(Ricardo, [1817] 1911, 1). It may be useful to call 
this type of economics, classical, or the “economics 
of production and distribution”, for want of a better 
shorthand.7
How does all this help us understand The Gen-
eral Theory? I will start with the following digres-
sion: Keynes in 1940 wrote a pamphlet titled How to 
Pay for the War and sent it to an intellectual friend of 
Lionel Robbins, F.A. Hayek, who in his reply letter, 
noted the following: “It is reassuring to know that 
we agree so completely on the economics of scarci-
ty, even if we differ on when it applies” (quoted in 
Skidelsky, 2006, 83). Keynes, according to Hayek’s 
comment, was not against the whole framework of 
neoclassical economics and its ethical, technical and 
analytic arguments but, more substantially, saw the 
limitations of this approach as a general system of 
analysis. Thus, the book is called The General The-
ory, exactly because he was building a framework 
that intended to envelop this economics as a special 
case. In The General Theory itself, in chapter three 
where Keynes introduces the principle of effective 
demand, he writes that in his new scheme “we shall 
find that the theory of prices falls into its proper place 
as a matter which is subsidiary to our general theory” 
(Keynes, 1936, 31-32).
It is reasonable to assume that the above quote re-
lates to prices as determined by market valuations, 
and therefore the analytical devices of “the econom-
ics of scarcity”. However Keynes in The General 
Theory uses broadly, and at times provocatively, the 
term Classical economics to refer to all economics 
before him, brushing aside the differences in the two 
traditions that were discussed briefly above. So to 
which tradition is he referring to in the above pas-
sage, the classical or the neoclassical one?
On December 31, 1933, the New York Times pub-
lished an open letter by Keynes to the new president 
of the US. F.D. Roosevelt. Therein he writes:
You are engaged on a double task, recovery and re-
form; recovery from the slump and the passage of those 
business and social reforms which are long overdue. 
For the first, speed and quick results are essential. The 
second maybe urgent too; but haste will be injurious 
and wisdom of long-range purpose is more necessary 
than immediate achievement. It will be through rais-
ing high the prestige of your Administration by success 
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in short-range recovery, that you will have the driving 
force to accomplish long-range reform.
On the other hand, even wise and necessary reform 
may, in some respects, impede and complicate recov-
ery. For it will upset the confidence of the business 
world and weaken their existing motives to action, be-
fore you have had time to put other motives in their 
place. (Keynes, 1933 [1982], 290-1)
This passage sets out exactly how Keynes thought 
about things. This is that long-term considerations 
of production and distribution come after remedial 
measures for recovery have been made in an economy 
suffering from unemployment and general economic 
depression. In short, Keynes’ economics can be seen 
as a generalisation of the classical system, in the fol-
lowing way: If the pre-condition of full employment 
is observed, something that cannot be assumed to be 
automatically observed in a modern economy, then 
questions on the distribution of the product of society 
can be discussed, and policies that deal with altering 
what different parts of society receive put on the ta-
ble in this new environment. However, if Keynes is 
generalising the classical model, what of neoclassi-
cal analysis? What is its space and domain? Does his 
system add to and extend the classical or the neoclas-
sical point of view? Opinion on this is divided, and 
this gives rise to different interpretative traditions 
on Keynes’ General Theory. In this paper, I follow a 
particular strand of Post-Keynesian analysis to argue 
that there is method in his madness, and that he is 
doing something quite different to simply extending 
either approach.
This paper argues for an interpretation that sees 
The General Theory, and Keynes’ mature thoughts on 
economics, as distinct to both perspectives and form-
ing its own approach —even if it borrows strongly 
from both. It is distinct because it is a system of anal-
ysis complete in itself that cannot be either reduced 
to or seen as a straight forward extension of the ana-
lytical framework and general vision of society of the 
neoclassical or the classical system. This view can be 
termed “the economics of fundamental uncertainty”, 
or “the economics of effective demand”, which I am 
going to use as part of the same family of definitions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 pre-
sents production and effective demand as it relates to 
short period analysis, and its links with classical eco-
nomics, which is one of the most well-known aspects 
of Keynesian theory. Section 3 adds to the above 
analysis the role of human agency and how this re-
lates to the core concept of uncertainty. I argue that 
given the nature of the individual and the problem of 
market valuation of goods, the market of labour be-
comes a core mechanism in how the individual sees 
society and their place in it. Section 4 links the above 
discussion with the General Theory’s overall vision 
of how material civilization is created and sustained, 
and the role that economists are expected to play. 
Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts and con-
nects this interpretation of the General Theory with 
the work of key Post-Keynesian writers. 
2. Production and effective demand
Keynes starts his analysis of the postulates of classi-
cal economics, (chapter 2) with the following lines:
Most treatises on the theory of value and produc-
tion are primarily concerned with the distribution of a 
given volume of employed resources between different 
uses and with the conditions which, assuming the em-
ployment of this quantity of resources, determine their 
relative rewards and the relative values of the products 
(Keynes, 1936, 4). 
He adds in a footnote that “this is the Ricardian 
tradition. For Ricardo expressly repudiated any inter-
est in the amount of the national dividend, as distinct 
from its distribution” (stress in the original, Keynes, 
1936, 4: footnote 1).
The interest in the amount of production the eco-
nomic system can produce, but may not be actually 
producing, is central to The General Theory. It is cen-
tral because it can give us a number of useful ways to 
see the economy and its processes at any particular 
point in time. This comes in full force in book III 
where Keynes develops one of the central tools of 
this new economics, the multiplier. In chapters 8 and 
9 he discusses the objective and subjective factors 
that form the short-period conditions of the aggre-
gate consumption function and the marginal propen-
sity to consume. The argument, although presented 
in a simple way, is quite complex. For the subjective 
factors –the motives that guide consumption for the 
individual– he claims that while these vary widely 
between societies, for each given society at every 
given time, “the distribution of wealth is determined 
by the more or less permanent social structure of the 
community” (Keynes, 1936, 110). He adds that this 
factor can be taken as given in the short run. Thus, 
people consume as their habits, social position, etc. 
dictate and these things are predictable enough in the 
short run to be taken, on average, as objective facts. 
This makes him conclude that what partly deter-
mines consumption in the short run is the available 
disposable income that the members of the commu-
nity have, and therefore factors that have to do with 
production. And he proceeds with this thought to its 
natural conclusion: “given the general economic sit-
uation, the expenditure on consumption in terms of 
the wage unit depend in the main, on the volume of 
output and employment” (Keynes, 1936, 96). This 
leads him to chapter 10, to the full development of 
the concept of the multiplier, which is a relationship 
between aggregate employment, income and the rate 
of investment. Through this we have a simple heuris-
tic which tells us how increasing, for example, gov-
ernment expenditure, will impact on employment 
and output in the short run.
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This may sound fairly obvious. However, the 
deeper ramifications of this analysis are both radi-
cal and controversial. First, it assumes that there is 
a determinate relationship between changes in ag-
gregate income, investment and total employment 
which can be discovered –through empirical testing 
and good judgment on the part of the economist– and 
then leaned on to precipitate changes in the volume 
of employment and income. The larger argument is 
that the economist can identify what the market can-
not —the opportunities to increase employment and 
output without, as such, leading to a radically new 
distribution of income in society at large, but only in 
aggregate scaling up total income by giving wages to 
currently unemployed workers. This starts a virtuous 
process through which labourers have an income, can 
consume and survive, entrepreneurs have someone to 
sell goods to and have a reason to increase production 
and further invest as their spirits improve due to the 
increased demand.
All this can continue until we reach the point of 
effective demand.8 This means that we can see de-
mand in this economy in radically different ways to 
how a neoclassical economist would view it. A neo-
classical economist would start from the tastes, rela-
tive prices and incomes individuals have, and would 
make an argument about the general level of demand 
for a good by the aggregation of preferences across 
individuals. In the neoclassical system it is individual 
demand that drives demand for products, and signals 
to producers what to produce of each good and how 
to distribute resources between goods.
In The General Theory, when discussing short-
run output determination, we see the whole process 
reversed. In the classical system, and especially in 
Ricardo’s work, as Keynes notes, Says law, which 
means supply creates its own demand, holds.9 For 
Ricardo, demand is simply a residual, the outcome of 
a complex set of production decisions which deter-
mine the consumption power of the different class-
es through the distribution of income. The fact that 
a level of income would exist in conjunction with 
a proportionate level of consumption is taken to be 
a tautology. Therefore, it is not considered possible 
that overall demand is ever deficient. Keynes uses Ri-
cardo’s way of seeing things, but adds the following 
imaginative twist: If we see demand in this ‘classi-
cal’ way and, at the same time, we drop the idea that 
Say’s law has to hold –i.e. supply will always cre-
ate enough demand to trigger full employment in the 
economy–, we find, instead, that we can start from 
the production potential of the economy and build 
8 According to Keynes, effective demand is an old term, emanating from the work of Thomas Robert Malthus. Keynes claims to have re-introduced 
this concept into theoretical analysis and embeds it in a new framework. 
9 “From the time of Say and Ricardo the classical economists have taught that supply creates its own demand” (Keynes, 1936, 18)
10 Chick notes that “Keynes’s method is something of a compromise, using the partial equilibrium method to analyse a market taken in isolation, then 
feeding the results back into the mainstream of economic events, which were themselves moving meanwhile” (Chick, 1983, 15).
11 The development of the multiplier has a long and complex history. The most important and definitive rendering is Richard Kahn’s (Kahn, 1931, pp. 
173-98) who was “inspired” (Kahn, 1984, 91) in this investigation by Can Lloyd George Do It? (Keynes and Henderson, 1929). The exact history 
of the development of the multiplier is not relevant to the argument here- what is important is to note how Keynes appropriates and embeds these 
tools in the overall structure of The General Theory. 
the demand that we need to have to make sure the 
economy reaches full employment. Thus, given the 
existing level of machinery, social and financial in-
stitutions and relations, we can find out how much of 
the labour can be gainfully employed before starting 
to run into shortages of labour, machinery or both.
Here Keynes builds on elements of classical the-
ory, and adds a neoclassical, and particularly Mar-
shallian flavour. He takes what in classical theory 
is effectively long-term analysis, meant to uncover 
deeper tendencies of capitalism in historical time, 
and turns it into a partial equilibrium, short-term 
heuristic that can give us very rough calculations 
for broad government intervention in the economy.10 
This neoclassical flavour extends to an important im-
plicit assumption: this kind of economics is a precon-
dition and analytically a step before the discussion of 
distribution and reform, which is the domain of deep 
production structures and class interests in classical 
analysis. Keynes attempts an analytical separation of 
the problem of distribution from the problem of un-
employment, and generally the use of unemployed 
resources in an economy, to which he gives prece-
dence. It is almost as if, from a liberal point of view, 
he is arguing: How can anyone be against putting 
people in employment and giving them an income if 
this comes at no-one’s expense, but adds to general 
gain and profit in society?
It may seem paradoxical that Keynes retains the 
ethical position of neoclassical economics, where 
it is embedded in the all-powerful sovereignty and 
equality of individual decisions, to an entirely differ-
ent system of economic analysis. Classical political 
economy explicitly accounts for power politics as its 
analytical structure explains the creation of surplus 
value and its distribution. Therefore, it is able to in-
corporate the reason why unemployment is not an 
unexpected remiss of the economic system, but part 
of the very system of power politics that production 
and distribution in society are based on. How can one 
combine the purportedly a-political moral stance of 
neoclassical economics, with an economics that part-
ly resembles classical theory?
3. Human agency, uncertainty and unemployment
The previous section on production spoke about the 
multiplier as a type of partial equilibrium tool that 
Keynes introduces to discuss determination of out-
put and employment in the short run.11 The multiplier 
is the most elaborate tool of the assortment of new 
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tools presented in The General Theory, but we can 
also find other simple heuristic devises for discussing 
short-run effects. The analysis of liquidity preference 
(chapter 15) is another such example, in this case a 
way to conceptualise the reasons why people hold 
cash in the modern economy. But The General Theo-
ry is not a complete box of tricks —if viewed as such 
it would appear wanting. It is more a method to create 
new tools that fit the situation at hand, and a method 
to see and analyse individual action embedded in his-
torical time.
The way the book develops its overarching nar-
rative on how to do economics, and its implicit com-
plex view of the individual form a deep unity. The 
book’s content, organisation and style of writing re-
flect the mode of thinking, the beliefs, and the charac-
ter of the author. The General Theory is written in an 
argumentative and conversational style with Keynes 
speaking freely in a way that projects the intimacy of 
a working but busy mind. For the reader to be able to 
decode the text, they must not only try to understand 
what Keynes is trying to say but why he is saying 
it and for what purpose. In this endeavour there is 
no single solution. The narratives that the reader can 
create are many and variable —and the intention is to 
train the reader not in perfecting one narrative, one 
viewpoint about the economy, but to train the reader 
in the art of creating narratives and trying to abstract 
in different ways.
This reader experience and its complex cognitive 
journey are fundamentally different to treatises in 
economics which build on deductive logic and em-
ploy a high degree of abstraction and simplification 
to arrive at a unified vision of the economy. Ricardo’s 
(1817) book can be seen as an example of this type of 
social theorising and Keynes in The General Theory 
uses Ricardo’s approach as a counterpoint to how he 
is trying to theorise.12 In Keynes’ method, deductive 
argument alone is not enough proof for establishing 
an analytical point’s insight into the real world. It is 
almost seen as a method that can deceive. Keynes 
seems to be worried that in the distance between re-
ality and syllogism, assumptions that the creator of 
the syllogism themselves may be unaware of can be 
introduced. This is why even when he is looking at 
identities he is investigating them from a number 
of perspectives. An example of this can be found 
in chapter six, where he is trying to define income, 
saving and investment, and to find their relation. He 
arrives at the outcome that saving equals investment 
by trying different angles and definitions of seeing 
the problem. It is as if he is compiling more and 
more evidence in the form of different perspectives 
of seeing the analytical problem and arriving at sim-
ilar conclusions. This inductive method of compiling 
deductive argument and investigating directly the 
meaning of the language used appears to be the way 
12 His antithesis to the Ricardian method of analysis is also evident in his life of Robert Malthus, who Keynes claims was the first of the Cambridge 
economists (see Keynes, 1933).  
that convinced him that this identity makes sense in 
the context in which he aims to use it.
This points not only to the non-linear thought pat-
terns Keynes engages in, but also to the complexity 
with which he imbues individual action. The individ-
uals that populate The General Theory are psycho-
logically complex persons that are part of the fabric 
of society as it unfolds in historical time. Their moti-
vations, interests and perspectives of the social world 
are a combination of insight, logic, imagination, con-
vention and strong social norms. Their actions are 
based on understanding what they can and cannot do 
in every situation that arises as it emanates from their 
perception of their environment. This perception is 
both how they analyse this particular situation and, 
at an abstract level, of how they think society in gen-
eral works. Their actions, but also the psychological 
imprint of their actions, are not invariant to the social 
conditions in which they act. Keynes writes in rela-
tion to unemployment:
When involuntary unemployment exists, the mar-
ginal disutility of labour is necessarily less than the 
utility of the marginal product. Indeed it may be much 
less. For a man who has been long unemployed some 
measure of labour, instead of involving disutility, may 
have a positive utility (Keynes, 1936, 128).
Thus, for Keynes, the very act of work is seen 
differently by the individual when there is gener-
al unemployment, to times when everyone is em-
ployed. The psychic calculus employed by individ-
uals deciding to supply longer hours of work, for a 
person who is fully employed and decides the bene-
fits of overtime pay against the pain of another hour 
of labour is not in any abstract way analogous to 
the problem of a person in long-term unemployment 
who may find, after much effort, part-time employ-
ment in a business. Even the same individual, find-
ing themselves in these dissimilar situations in dif-
ferent parts of their life would engage in new ways 
of making sense of their environment. The way they 
understand and analyse these situations changes as 
the individual accumulates experience and forms 
new narratives of how the world works, and what is 
their place in it.
The above brief analysis of human agency and 
its complex psychological makeup gives us an in-
dication of the difficulty individuals face across a 
range of decisions and actions they have to take. As 
a response they find simplifications when thinking 
about specific problems that allow them to take de-
cisions. Keynes identifies some of these simplifica-
tions, when, for example, he discusses the choice 
between saving and consuming, realising that this 
can be seen as a two-step process. In chapter 12, he 
writes:
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The psychological time-preferences of an individ-
ual require two distinct sets of decisions to carry them 
out completely. The first is concerned with that aspect 
of time-preference which I have called the propensity 
to consume, which,…, determines for each individu-
al how much of his income he will consume and how 
much he will reserve in some form of command over 
future consumption.
But this decision having been made, there is a fur-
ther decision which awaits him, namely, in what form 
he will hold the command over future consumption 
which he has reserved (stress in original, Keynes, 
1936, 166).
This example shows that individuals try to think 
about the decisions they have to take procedurally, 
by separating a complex problem into smaller fairly 
self-contained steps. An added complication to the 
fact that agents have to find heuristics to break down 
complex decisions to be able to act, is the uncertainty 
they face.
There are two types of uncertainty that are perti-
nent to this discussion- uncertainty about the present 
and uncertainty about the future.13 One fundamental 
insight of The General Theory is that for the indi-
vidual, even the present is to some degree unknown. 
Our perception of reality is a combination of facts, 
and keys to understand these facts. These are narra-
tives that explain and give meaning to these facts and 
create the basis for taking action. Where perspectives 
end and facts begin is itself a line which holds lit-
tle agreement among different persons. Individuals 
may designate as facts different parts of their narra-
tives, and indeed may themselves change these de-
marcation lines as their understanding of a situation 
evolves, or as their perspectives shift.
Uncertainty about the present stems from two fac-
tors, one is from the concept of the individual, who is 
sovereign enough to construct their own understand-
13 In the following discussion I see uncertainty as a problem of knowledge, before it becomes a problem of action. In this I am following an interpre-
tation of Keynes (1937A) who elaborated on his view of uncertainty as different to a problem of merely distinguishing “what is known for certain 
from what is only probable” (Keynes, 1937A, 213). What Keynes meant is “the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and 
the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. 
About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know” (Keynes, 1937A, 
214). One way to see this is what Paul Davidson calls “nonergodic uncertainty” (see Davidson, 1991, 143, and Davidson, 2007, 2011). An extension 
of this insight is to see the problem facing the individual on the knowledge of their immediate economic, social and institutional surroundings as 
also part of the same fundamental problem. 
14 The individual perspective, as a concept, is a fairly modern invention. Most traditional societies (not all) have interpretations of facts delivered in 
narratives which have special authority (e.g. religious texts), and mechanisms that discipline any member of the community departing from this 
interpretation of facts. This meant that human action and choices are, to a large extent, the outcome of a hierarchical or social decision-making 
process, with little individual human agency. That modernity is defined by this individual perspective combined with a degree of autonomous action 
brings forth this entirely new form of agency, and the social structures that support and enable it. This means that action is now based more on 
narratives that are particular to the individual and their view of the environment as they perceive it.
15 I leave outside the discussion on uncertainty that has to do with changes in the physical environment out of human control, or the control of the 
particular society. Therefore, I do not discuss uncertainty that relates with natural disasters, epidemics, wars or hordes of barbarians passing by and 
therefore to some degree unknown events that are faced by all societies in human history. Some of these events may have known probability dis-
tributions (and indeed equivalent to what Keynes said about the weather as only moderately uncertain (Keynes, 1937A, 214)) other more radically 
uncertain (an asteroid hitting earth), but share the following important attribute: they are not particular to capitalism, or the new forms of uncertainty 
the market economy brings forth. Sustained technological progress I take to be different, first, because it is particularly identified with the industrial 
revolution and therefore with the advent of capitalism, and second, because it challenges consumption and production decisions at the individual 
level, in new ways that are particular to this system of social organisation and opens up completely new and unimagined spaces of thought and 
action. 
16 “Actually, however, we have as a rule, only the vaguest idea of any but the most direct consequences of our acts” (Keynes, 1937A, 213).
17 As Latsis (2005) notes, a convention is a structure “that is essentially arbitrary, neither an ‘optimal solution’, nor a solution that conforms to 
ing of a situation and has the ability to act according 
to their decisions from a range of choices, and second 
from the inherent complexity of the modern econo-
my, which defies any single individual from having 
complete knowledge of what is happening. Tradition-
al societies in which the concept of the individual is 
less central in determining human action and where 
production and consumption decisions are substan-
tially less complex would not experience this type of 
uncertainty.14 If these societies are technologically 
stagnant and socially stable they would not experi-
ence future uncertainty as well.15
In contradistinction modern social organisation 
faces both problems at once. Individuals face uncer-
tainty concerning the outcomes of the choice they 
make, because their decisions depend on simple 
heuristics, judgements based on narratives and un-
derstandings of the situation and the broader social 
context. Even if nothing changes in the real situations 
that individuals are facing, agents may change their 
actions only because their understanding of the situa-
tion has changed. This single change may have ripple 
effects that are, to some degree, unknown and un-
knowable to the individual.16 This is compounded by 
the problem of a very complex network of production 
and distribution decisions that operate at any point 
in time and, of unknown and unknowable products, 
opportunities and social conditions, that will appear 
in the future. 
The outcomes of all this is a social system that 
arrives at market valuations for goods and services 
through a path-dependent historical process partly led 
by accounting definitions of cost and partly by chance 
and other economic and social factors that solidify 
valuations of goods into prices. These prices together 
with the mechanisms —markets or other institutional 
environments—– that deliver them are seen as con-
ventions.17 However, these prices are in precarious 
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stability as outcomes of social convention, as they are 
not the product of a narrative —religious or other— 
that has special social meaning for this community, or 
the outcome of an invariant way that accounts for the 
cost of production that individuals can easily check 
and appeal to. They are taken as given only because 
they are serviceable to some degree, and perceived to 
be acceptable by the large majority of individuals that 
they directly relate to either as producers or as con-
sumers. Accepting these valuations and the authority 
behind them is a necessary cognitive simplification 
that the social environment delivers to individuals and 
they take as a social fact, in normal conditions, when 
making their decisions.18
How individuals make decisions and its relation 
to socially accepted valuations is one thing. The psy-
chic importance or value individuals ascribe to goods 
is another. The problem of perception at an individual 
level has been broached above, but the broader social 
ramifications of this understanding have not been dis-
cussed. The outcome of this realisation is that there 
is no inherent reason why the value an individual as-
cribes to a particular good is also the market price. A 
trivial example is a family heirloom. The market val-
uation may be determined by fashions regarding the 
tastes for that good, conventions regarding whether 
there is an established markets for it, scarcity of simi-
lar objects on offer, etc. But the valuation one ascribes 
to these artefacts partly depend on the associations 
that object has for them, and may decide to sell this 
artefact only in abnormal situations like times of seri-
ous need. The broader point is less obvious and hints 
to the fact that for a large volume of goods that indi-
viduals deal with, either their valuation mirrors the 
market valuations because they accept the authority 
of the social conventions that delivers the observed 
prices, and they admit them as fair valuations when 
they decide what to buy, or are in violent disagree-
ment with these prices because they do not accept the 
social mechanism that delivers this pricing.19
This problem of variance between what one be-
lieves to be a fair value and the market value is a sys-
temic problem of the market economy, and does in-
fluence a whole range of goods and services. Keynes, 
however, was not worried about small injustices that 
are a necessary evil of existence, but more with deep-
er problems in market valuations that could upset the 
very precarious economic and social balance of the 
system. It is for this that he focuses the whole of The 
any universal social law” (Latsis, 2005, 726). Therefore, the very construction of market frameworks and their price and quantity exchanges are part 
of an historical social process in an environment of uncertainty (see Latsis, 2006, Latsis et. al., 2014).  
18 That this view is radically different to a supply-demand framework for determining prices, quantities and market interaction was observed by an 
early reader of Keynes, Roy Harrod. When reading The General Theory in galley proofs he wrote to Keynes in August 1935 “Its effectiveness [of 
the GT] is diminished if you try to eradicate very deep-rooted habits of thought unnecessarily. One of these is the supply and demand analysis… It is 
doing great violence to their fundamental groundwork of thought, if you tell them that two independent demand and supply functions won’t jointly 
determine price and quantity” (Keynes, 1973, 533-4). Keynes replied “[but] my whole point is that the functions in question are not independent” 
(Keynes, 1973, 538). 
19 Recent work on conventions has focused on how they are both arbitrary and normative. Al-Amoudi and Latsis (2014) note how “a convention is 
not the unique response to a given social situation” (Al-Amoudi and Latsis, 2014, 359) and at the same time “conventions are also widely seen as 
normative binding in some weak sense” (Al-Amoudi and Latsis, 2014, 359). And yet while conventions have some plasticity to adopt as conditions 
change, there are situations where the agent can refuse to accept to conform, exactly because they are understood to be arbitrary.
General Theory on the problem of unemployment. 
He sees employment, and the price it commands, the 
wage rate, as the preeminent social problem an indi-
vidual faces in the capitalist economy.
For the individual, the problem of employment 
can be seen to be both the most complex market deci-
sion and the most psychologically charged one. It is 
so charged because it is at the nexus of the narrative 
the individual constructs about themselves and their 
relation with society in general, through its pre-em-
inent mechanism of valuation, the marketplace for 
labour. If the individual completely rejects the val-
uation that the market ascribes to their labour, either 
because they cannot find any proper job, or the wage 
they receive does not allow them to live in a way they 
and their social peers find acceptable, then their trust 
in the market as a mechanism of valuation in gener-
al falls into question. In capitalist bourgeois society, 
market prices, although they determine distribution, 
do not have the moral weight and justification that tra-
ditional societies ascribe to their distribution of work 
and goods that come through religious and secular 
texts and are supported by established social hierar-
chies. What remains as a social defence mechanism 
is simply the weight of the majority and their trust 
in the system, i.e. the narratives the individual con-
structs about the overall acceptability and fairness of 
the market system. In conditions of economic crises 
and depression, the number of people that lose trust 
in the system, mostly because they lose their jobs and 
therefore their ability to command resources as con-
sumers and their place in society as full productive 
members, grows. This creates a dynamic of extreme 
social and economic instability. Keynes wrote:
Men will not always die quietly. For starvation, which 
brings to some lethargy and a helpless despair, drives 
other temperaments to the nervous instability of hyste-
ria and to a mad despair. And these in their distress may 
overturn the remnants of organization, and submerge civ-
ilization itself in their attempts to satisfy desperately the 
overwhelming needs of the individual. This is the danger 
against which all our resources and courage and idealism 
must now co-operate. (Keynes, 1919, 144)
4. The general theory’s view on material civilization
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The outstanding faults of the economic society in 
which we live are its failure to provide for full em-
ployment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribu-
tion of wealth and incomes (Keynes, 1936, 372).
Keynes could not, for all its faults, allow capital-
ism to meet its end. This was both because he was 
as a liberal, believing that the systems’ virtues out-
weigh its injustices, and because he could not see an 
alternative better system of social organisation that 
could take its place. The outcome is that The General 
Theory both tries to save capitalism and pays tribute 
to its attractive features. Keynes does this by creat-
ing a utopian vision of an imaginary social system 
that combines the dynamism of the free market with 
an enlarged government sector that acts to buttress 
against the excesses of the market system.
The basis of the utopian vision, as in all treatis-
es of political economy from the enlightenment until 
Keynes’ time,20 is a theory of the progress of material 
civilization. This analysis completes Keynes’ sys-
tematic view of the capitalist system, and adds a third 
alternative to both the ‘economics of scarcity’ and 
the ‘economics of production and distribution’. In his 
theory consumption, production and human agency 
are given new roles and meanings on how they cre-
ate and sustain the material basis of civilization. This 
new vision of the social order that forms The General 
Theory’s utopia comes centre stage in chapter 24, but 
glimpses can be found across chapters and it is the 
theme that holds the book together.
Utopian visions are necessarily long-term per-
spectives on the economic and social order. Keynes 
directly borrows the method of Adam Smith’s Wealth 
of Nations and sets this long-term analysis firmly in 
historical instead of abstract time.21 This allows him 
to discuss long-term tendencies of the market system 
and, to speak about the evolution of institutions and 
their position in the economic order. This theory of 
material progress comes through in different exam-
ples and vignettes in various parts of the book, and 
it is more an accumulation of insights, methods and 
realistic hopes about the possibilities for the current 
system rather than a comprehensive blueprint of how 
to reform society. It can be reconstructed in a number 
of ways, and one way to do so is by starting from the 
following quote:
Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate, and doubt-
less owed to this its fabled wealth, in that it possessed 
two activities, namely, pyramid-building as well as 
the search for the precious metals, the fruits of which, 
since they could not serve the needs of man by being 
consumed, did not stale with abundance. The Middle 
Ages built cathedrals and sang dirges. Two pyramids, 
two masses for the dead, are twice as good as one; but 
20 Keynes writes of himself and his intellectual milieu “of another eighteenth-century heresy we were the unrepentant heirs and last upholders. We 
were among the last of the Utopians…” (Keynes, 1938, 447).
21 For example, in his chapter on the theory of prices (chapter 21) he writes “So far, we have been primarily concerned with the way in which changes 
in the quantity of money affect prices in the short period. But in the long run is there not some simpler relationship? This is a question for historical 
generalisation rather than for pure theory.” (Keynes, 1936, 306)
not so two railways from London to York. Thus we 
are so sensible, have schooled ourselves to so close a 
semblance of prudent financiers, taking careful thought 
before we add to the ‘financial’ burdens of posterity 
by building them houses to live in, that we have no 
such easy escape from the sufferings of unemployment 
(Keynes, 1936, 131).
One of the central elements of The General Theory 
is not only to re-establish the insight that at any point 
in time demand may fall short of its appropriate level, 
that is, the level that clears the labour market, but also 
that it re-instates demand as an important element in 
long-term analysis. This it does by re-evaluating the 
importance of the individual in the economic system, 
and the way individuals imagine and can transform 
the future. Let us, for a moment, follow Keynes, 
think somewhat wildly, and take seriously the prob-
lem of building pyramids. A long time ago a Pharaoh, 
akin to God, ruled over the Old Kingdom of Egypt. 
He had a chancellor called Imhotep, who, from what 
we can tell from archaeological evidence, was a ge-
nius and an architect and created for his pharaoh the 
first step pyramid of Egypt. This started a trend of 
building pyramids that lasted over 500 years. Many 
pharaohs that followed built bigger, more techno-
logically advanced —more exact in proportions and 
measurements— and refined versions of the original 
idea. The reason was that it was the custom of that 
land that the king would, after his death, be interred 
in a tomb, and he needed a tomb that would be equiv-
alent to his station in life, and his status vis-à-vis his 
ancestors. This created a societal need for continu-
ously larger and better pyramids, and the process of 
improvement was a continual one until we reach the 
reign of Cheops about 100 years later, the builder of 
the great pyramid of Gyza, the largest pyramid of the 
Old Kingdom. After that the pharaohs who followed 
could not really compete with this achievement and 
Khafra and Mykerinos built smaller pyramids next to 
the great one. The trend of pyramid building contin-
ued for centuries, until the very social organisation of 
the Old Kingdom fell into chaos, as central adminis-
tration seem to have collapsed and many local rulers 
gained semi-independence and vied for the crown. 
This was the end of the Old Kingdom and the begin-
ning of what archaeologists call the first intermediate 
period that led to the middle kingdom —a very dif-
ferent period of Egyptian art and culture.
Building pyramids is no simple business. Apart 
from technological knowhow, you need also to com-
mand substantial labour power, which should be 
available for long periods of time to do extremely 
arduous work. You need to find new solutions for 
organising the workforce as you scale up produc-
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tion, change the chain of production as you improve 
measurements, have more exacting standards and 
use better building material, and find ways to pro-
vide for labour during this period of work. In ancient 
Egypt, with limited external trade, the food surplus 
produced from the agriculture sector should be great 
enough to cover the labour cost devoted to the con-
struction of the pyramid until it is complete. This so-
ciety would need to find new and sophisticated ways 
of collecting, storing and distributing food from the 
agricultural sector to the pyramid building sector. In 
modern parlance, they would need to develop new 
financial instruments that can support the new com-
plex production process that is needed to deliver the 
good that the central bureaucracy is bent on build-
ing. From this perspective, finance is another way to 
say a social agreement on provisioning. It is simply 
claims from one part of society to another to deliver 
purchasing power today on the expectation of future 
returns —in this world or the next.22
The crucial point is that the creation of financial 
tools is not separate from the production process. 
On the contrary, it is the reason sophisticated pro-
duction can take place. Pharaohs had to have not 
only warehouses to keep the food that they need-
ed for the workforce, but logistics to keep account 
of the stock and some distribution network to give 
out proper meals to the workers. Then they needed 
some mechanism to restock depleting provisions in 
warehouses, and foresee the provision needs over 
—at least— the next few months, and capacity to do 
financial planning over long periods of time or the 
pyramid would not be finished. This financial side 
developed pari passu with technological achieve-
ments, the management of the workforce knowhow, 
and the increased ability of the agricultural sector 
to produce enough of a food surplus to sustain the 
workforce working on the pyramid. All this activity 
was driven by the demand for a good by a central-
ised bureaucracy run by a living God and his —so-
cially embedded— tastes.
This elaborate example gives a theory of the forc-
es that shape material civilization that is different 
from both the neoclassical and classical perspectives. 
The neoclassical viewpoint, which has as its organ-
ising principle scarcity and choice, cannot encom-
pass this dynamic view of material change driven 
in a sustained fashion from demand. In neoclassical 
theory, individual preferences, together with compe-
tition from producers, determine prices in the various 
markets of goods, and increases in demand in some 
sectors bid away resources from others, as produc-
tion follows the sovereign tastes of consumers. But 
22 In Keynes’ own terms “In what follows I use the term “finance” to mean the credit required in the interval between planning and execution” 
(Keynes, 1937, 663: footnote 2). 
23 This presentation of the classical position is not intended to be exhaustive or representative of all authors of previous eras, even major ones, (Adam 
Smith) who have a complex and varied following. It intends to represent a very simplified form of some strands of the Ricardian School in order to 
show the difference with this reading of The General Theory. Keynes himself in chapter 23 of The General Theory builds a narrative of alternative 
ways of seeing the economy. For example, he repeatedly mentions Robert Malthus as a forerunner of his economics both in The General Theory 
and in his life of Malthus (Keynes, 1972, 71-103) and in chapter 23 is sympathetic to many mercantilist writers.   
the overall logic of the system is that it is generally 
constrained by scarcity, with demand across sectors 
following the increased productivity from new tech-
nology that becomes available.
The classical view is difficult to discuss succinct-
ly as e.g. David Ricardo and Karl Marx built differ-
ent systems that cannot be easily summarised for the 
purposes of this paper. Without attributing this view 
to any individual author, let us assume, for contrast, 
that by and large the classical view, at least in part, is 
the following: production and distribution arise from 
the technological basis and from the social and in-
stitutional relations of the community. Over time, as 
technology advances, it enables and, to some degree 
requires, the development of new and more sophis-
ticated structures of social and institutional relations 
that come into existence. This material basis together 
with the institutional structures which exist in direct 
relation to and symbiotically with, give rise to a sur-
plus over and above what this society needs to repro-
duce its productive potential. This surplus is divid-
ed through the interplay of class and other interests, 
as institutional and other social relations dictate. As 
this surplus grows, a consequence of the increasing 
ability of technologically sophisticated societies to 
re-produce and expand their capital base, so does its 
distribution became an issue in the social arena that 
can create instability and economic crises.23
The above brief outline gives both an historical 
materialist and a teleological narrative to the classical 
position. Although it does not do justice to any one 
classical writer, it is a useful narrative for showing 
the differences with this reading of Keynes’ General 
Theory. In Keynes’ position, the interplay of capital 
formation, production and demand is less unidirec-
tional. Material conditions give the potential for the 
creation of a complex production system but not the 
certainty. For example, although agriculture on the 
river Nile could produce enough surplus to build the 
great pyramid of Giza, it did so only once over 500 
years that the Old Kingdom existed. The question is 
what happened to this surplus over these other peri-
ods? One can argue that war, natural disasters, etc. 
made the surplus fluctuate over time. Also mistakes 
in technology —not all pyramids survived construc-
tion— political and dynastic instability meant that 
some investment went to waste. All of these obser-
vations are true to some extent, but they miss the 
point, which is that the surplus does not exist inde-
pendently of the demand for pyramids. The demand 
for pyramids necessitates the creation of new social 
institutions that could support the increasingly com-
plex production process. Increasing demand gave 
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rise to a system in which the creation of agricultural 
surplus and its distribution are two sides of the same 
coin. With the collapse of demand for the creation of 
pyramids either because of political instability and/or 
because this competition with building bigger pyra-
mids reached its resource limits, this surplus was not 
diverted to other uses, it ceased, over time, to exist. 
As the institutions that came into existence for the 
production of pyramids atrophied, with it the very so-
phisticated organisation of the land that provided the 
produce devolved. In the end the technology of how 
to build great pyramids was lost, and with it knowl-
edge of how to finance such projects in a society 
that had, from the modern perspective, such limited 
means.24
This creates a vision of material progress in which 
material conditions do not uni-directionally deter-
mine the future. Material conditions both create the 
space for human agency, and also human agency 
creates the material conditions that are necessary for 
technological advancement. At the other end, crises 
that lead to revolutions are possible but not inevita-
ble, and the potential of secular stagnation and other 
kinds of deterioration of a technologically advanced 
civilization over time due to chronically deficient 
demand introduced as a prospect. In this view, hu-
man agency through social and financial institutions 
comes centre stage in creating and sustaining mate-
rial prosperity.
The problem that Keynes identifies is that there 
is no automatic tendency through which this hap-
pens, and the market system in no way guarantees 
that this high employment position will be reached in 
the short run or the long run. In fact, there is reason 
to expect that the market system continually under-
performs in this regard. Fundamental uncertainty and 
the profit motive drive the capitalist to be somewhat 
conservative about the future, and to plan according 
to the logic and habits of the past.25 The outcome of 
this tendency is for the system to veer towards chron-
ic underemployment. Keynes identified this problem 
in the chronic tendency of industrial society to have 
a higher rate of interest than is necessary. In a pro-
vocative fashion, he claims that interest cannot, any 
more, be seen as a reward for saving, but simply the 
outcome of power relations in the money market. The 
ability of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity value 
of capital and demand interest payment is a social 
24 It is useful here to juxtapose this position with a quote from the celebrated restatement of the Classical position by Sraffa (1960). He writes “One 
effect of the emergence of the surplus must be noticed. Previously, all commodities ranked equally, each of them being found both among the 
products and among the means of production; as a result each, directly and indirectly, entered into the production of all the others, and each played 
a part in the determination of the prices. But now there is room for a new class of ‘luxury’ products which are not used whether as instruments of 
production or as articles of subsistence, in the production of others. These products have no part in the determination of the system. Their role is 
purely passive” (Sraffa, 1960, 6-7). Sraffa notes that this is a natural way to think of Ricardo’s system (Sraffa, 1960, 111). This is a different un-
derstanding of the capitalist system to The General Theory, which implicitly sees production of goods in an economy in a more organic way. Thus, 
collapse of demand in one sector, would mean collapse of aggregate demand that would affect all sectors over time, and eventually the very nature 
of social organisation, even if there was no explicit mutual production relationship between these sectors to start off with. This difference in the two 
visions is explored in (Lee and Jo, 2011). But this does not mean that dialogue is impossible (see Martins, 2011, 2013, 2014). 
25 Although progress comes from the opposite impulse –the entrepreneur’s natural tendency to almost unfounded (in logic) optimism that is “our 
decision to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal 
spirits– of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction… “ (Keynes, 1936, 161)
26 If, of course, all officials started on the same racket things would be rather different. 
artefact. “There are no intrinsic reasons for the scar-
city of capital” (Keynes, 1998 [1936], 376) and if the 
capitalist refuses to save and invest under these new 
conditions, the state could cover this gap through so-
cial provisioning.
At the same time, low rates of interest and cheap 
credit by themselves may not lead either to growth 
and a more equitable distribution or reduced un-
employment. The core problem emanates from this 
new type of uncertainty that is the defining feature 
of this social system. Uncertainty of this kind allows 
and even leads individuals to speculative activity. 
In a system that does not display uncertainty, either 
because it does not possess enough complexity in 
production or/and has no strong tendency to action 
derived from individual motives, as most activities 
follow fairly established societal rituals, speculation 
makes a limited, if any, appearance. In these cases 
what financing there is, is of a habitual nature. In 
traditional societies that display an evolving and in-
creasingly sophisticated production pattern, some de-
gree of financial speculation may start to appear. For 
example, it can be imagined that one of the scribes/
builders who kept stock of the great warehouses of 
a pharaoh building their pyramid, may have decided 
to borrow a few sacks of corn to celebrate his daugh-
ter’s wedding to a high ranking official, expecting to 
pay it back from profits he earns in smaller building 
projects he does on the side. It is reasonable for him 
to expect more business due to his increasing influ-
ence in court. Of course the scribe would never steal 
from his God and Pharaoh, but would very well bor-
row from him without telling him. This side loan by 
itself would not really endanger the production of the 
pyramid, as finance could be stretched in this way, 
and by further extending credit in this speculative 
way marginally increase aggregate demand in the 
economy at no one’s cost.26
However, it is with the modern conception of the 
individual that speculation comes into its own. Indi-
viduals who see themselves as possessing substantial 
freedom of action to pursue their own ends; Individ-
uals who believe they have the ability and right to 
form an independent understanding of situations and 
have the means and legal rights to act on their beliefs. 
Furthermore, if a broad class of people, in this social 
framework, are given access to markets and institu-
tions in which speculation for profit is the norm, the 
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system develops new forms of dynamic instability. 
Keynes writes:
It is usually agreed that casinos should, in the pub-
lic interest, be inaccessible and expensive. And perhaps 
the same is true of stock exchanges. That the sins of 
the London Stock Exchange are less than those of Wall 
Street may be due, not so much to differences in na-
tional character, as to the fact that to the average Eng-
lishman Throgmorton Street is, compared with Wall 
Street to the average American, inaccessible and very 
expensive….The introduction of a substantial govern-
ment transfer tax on all transactions might prove the 
most serviceable reform available, with a view to miti-
gating the predominance of speculation over enterprise 
in the United States (Keynes, 1936, 159-60).
The above quote gives us a flavour of the very 
complex role the state plays in the new utopian vision 
of The General Theory. It is not only to make sure 
that full employment is achieved, but to become a 
whole other field of activity that reviews and modi-
fies market behaviour- and yet does not stifle the lib-
erty of individual agency. Keynes is neither pining 
for an idealised traditional society, nor for a full so-
cialisation of production, and with it a centralisation 
of narratives of human need and required action. He 
writes that if we find a system that deals with these 
excesses “the traditional advantages of individual-
ism will still hold good” (Keynes, 1936, 380). And 
there are many benefits to individualism, that range 
from gains in efficiency  —if you enable individuals 
to take some ownership of the processes they are in-
volved in— to happiness, as individuals who display 
agency find meaning in what they do.
Which returns us to the question that was posed in 
Section 2. How do we combine a view of society that 
has individual freedom and liberalism as one of its 
core values, and at the same time deal with a system 
that naturally leads to substantial instability, uncer-
tainty and in the end crisis or stagnation? Are we left 
with no alternative than finding the right balance be-
tween the special interests of the different sectors of 
society which are in natural conflict and impose this 
enforced balance on them?
Keynes’ utopian social vision was part of the en-
lightenment tradition. He believed in creating spaces 
that aligned social interests through reason and argu-
ment, instead of the need of power politics with the 
inevitable narrative of winners and losers. Uncertain-
ty has an unexpected positive consequence; no one 
can be absolutely secure in their knowledge of either 
everything in their environment or their future. In fact, 
even in cases when substantial parts of the problem 
27 The fact that the eclipse of unemployment would lead to a transformation of the social relations between classes, and as such will be resisted, was 
observed very early on by Keynesian economists. Kalecki in 1943 noted “It is true that profits would be higher under a regime of full employment 
that they are on average under laisser-faire; [but business leaders’] class instincts tell them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point 
of view..”(Kalecki, 1943, 326).
28 This re-imagining was not meant to be easy, as Kelecki noted in 1943. Sheila Dow wrote exactly 30 years ago “The lesson to be learned from the 
experience with the General Theory over the last 50 years is that ‘changing the way the world thinks about economic problems’ is an extremely 
difficult task…” (Dow, 1988, 109) And so it remains. 
are known, a reordering of complex facts in new nar-
ratives may yield entirely new understandings. Thus, 
the possibility of people not knowing what really is 
in their interest at every point in time should not be 
discounted. If this is a pervasive feature of the system 
what remains is to convince people to change their 
perspective, their narrative of the situation as they un-
derstand it. The argument behind Keynes’ theory of 
material civilisation is that it is in everyone’s interest 
to make sure that demand remains high, because this 
sustains the very nature of economic surplus that adds 
to the spoils of those in power —even if the interests of 
the groups on how these spoils are to be distributed is 
in tension, unemployment is to no-one’s benefit.
Furthermore, if this agreement is achieved, it 
forms the basis for more common ground to be found 
in a variety of other fields.27 Aligning objectives is 
a process of social interaction and evolution in the 
same way that bartering for conflicting aims is. Both 
processes have at their core understanding the issues, 
conflict, adaptation, change and at least a modicum 
of social agreement in the process of give-and-take 
and its limits. What differs is the emphasis they place 
on these concepts and as a consequence the direction 
their imagination takes in finding solutions to their 
problems.28 The event spaces that these two process-
es arrive at are fundamentally different  —because 
the conflicting parties use their energy in a different 
fashion and are willing to come up with another set of 
solutions to their real and perceived needs.
Within a society that has achieved, or is willing to 
experiment with, this kind of social engineering, the 
economist can play an enlarged role and different to 
the one envisioned in neoclassical and classical eco-
nomics. Between the view of the economist as a spe-
cialist dealing in technocratic matters for the benefit 
of efficiency or to redistribute resources between in-
dividuals given a political mandate, and the economist 
who focuses on class interests and their clash in the so-
cio-political arena, there is the economist who works 
in developing broadly consensual change, being fully 
aware of the moral implications of their suggestions 
and enacting an acrobatic balance between realities, 
needs, practical limitations and imagination.
The technical part of the job is to come up with 
heuristics that can achieve specifically set social ob-
jectives. This is in the tradition of the Marshallian Ce-
teris paribus analysis. Taking everything else which 
appears to be given as given, then one can analyse 
the relation of key variables to each other. Although 
Keynes uses the same process as Marshall, the con-
ceptual foundation of the Ceteris Paribus clause is 
different. Marshall used it as a tool to do partial anal-
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ysis of an integrated economic system that was, in 
its broad contours, known; i.e. a market economy 
organised around individual preferences and produc-
tion costs. The assumption was that immediate ef-
fects could be separated from the second rate effects 
influencing other more remote markets. For Keynes 
the clause is to separate parts of the system which 
the economist can reasonably guess to be known and 
impose a narrative on them, from the complex reality 
which is, at the moment, and will remain in its total-
ity, essentially unknown and unknowable. Thus the 
The General Theory is not so much a work of theory 
of how the economy works, but a work on method 
for how the economist should work. Keynes writes:
The onset of our analysis is, not to provide a ma-
chine, or method of blind manipulation, which will fur-
nish an infallible answer, but to provide ourselves with 
an organised and orderly method of thinking out par-
ticular problems; and, after we have reached a provi-
sional conclusion by isolating the complicating factors 
one by one, we then have to go back on ourselves and 
allow, as well as we can, for the probable interactions 
of the factors amongst themselves. This is the nature of 
economic thinking. (Keynes, 1936, 297)
The non-technical part of the job of the economist 
is to imagine the creation of institutions and solutions 
that would further foster common ground dynamics 
in the social sphere. Uncertainty is both the challenge 
that threatens social organisation and the opportuni-
ty for humane solutions. In this process The General 
Theory can act as an apocryphal mental anchor for the 
reader.29 The Keynesian economist is like an architect 
inheriting a medieval cathedral centuries in the mak-
ing, with a book of blueprints that don’t fit together, 
grand ideas most of which never came to pass and ex-
amples that don’t exactly fit the present. And yet they 
would be lost without the book. It is how they see the 
cathedral. It is on whose pages their ideas take shape 
and from which they learn how to reason. It is how 
they keep the cathedral from becoming a ruin. Keynes, 
towards the end of his life, eloquently opined on the 
economists and their social mandate:
I give you the toast of the Royal Economic Society, 
of economics and the economists who are the trustees 
not of civilization, but the possibility of civilization. 
(Harrod, 1951, 193-4)
5. The General Theory and the Post-Keynesians
29 As Gotti (1994) argues “The General Theory is one of the few non-literary texts in which the author, willingly and knowingly, gives the reader not 
merely the role of decoding the text and assenting to the views propounded, but an altogether more demanding and important role as the author’s 
collaborator in the working out of the final form and the exact meaning of the new economic theory” (Gotti, 1994, 186).
30 A starting point on the different strands of Post-Keynesian economics can be found in Harcourt (1987A) or Harcourt (2006). For alternative narra-
tives on Cambridge Post-Keynesian analysis and its relation to classical and neoclassical theory see Pasinetti (2007) and Martins (2014).
31 This is very close to Lawson’s key notions of internal relations, open systems and a pluralist ontological framework (see Martins, 2013A, 66). 
Lawson in (Lawson, 1997, 2003) explores the ontological and methodological groundwork for this approach.
This paper explains how The General Theory devel-
ops a new way of economic theorising that is dis-
tinct to the classical and neoclassical perspectives. 
The importance of uncertainty as the core message 
of the General Theory follows an interpretative line 
that emanates from the work of George Shackle, 
Hyman Minsky, Geoffrey Harcourt, Victoria Chick, 
Sheila Dow and others, and gave rise to this strand 
of Post-Keynesian analysis. This reconstruction is 
not intended to be an exact expression of their views, 
but it shares with them key elements and especially 
how uncertainty is a pervasive feature of the modern 
economy, and an organising principle around which 
a distinct view of the social and economic system can 
be constructed. That this is the defining ontological 
feature of the economic system is an assumption of 
this particular strand of Post-Keynesian analysis, and 
other strands would read The General Theory from a 
completely different perspective and, construct nar-
ratives of its message using other core principles.30 
This interpretation gives a unified picture of The 
General Theory by adopting the position that its per-
ceived disjunction is part of its message. This is not 
an uncontroversial statement. A reader who wants to 
see how the different chapters of The General Theory 
can give rise to independent broad narratives can start 
on this path by reading Harcourt and Riach (1997).
Harcourt’s contributions can be used to under-
stand how three important aspects of this strand of 
Post-Keynesian analysis come together. In Harcourt 
(1987) we find that Keynesian thinking has three cen-
tral pillars: the whole is more than the sum of the 
parts, agents act in a context of inescapable uncer-
tainty, and in order to understand the complex nature 
of reality we need a plurality of languages and ap-
proaches.31 This methodological plurality is further 
discussed in Harcourt (2001) where he speaks of his 
experience in using different frameworks of econom-
ic analysis to gain insight in different aspects of the 
world and its workings. This perspective sees both 
classical and neoclassical theory as useful viewpoints 
in understanding aspects of the modern economy. 
Both viewpoints have many uses, not always in con-
tention, as useful mental constructs that shed light in 
parts of the current social and economic reality and 
the ways we understand and act upon it.
The deep commitment to a pluralist approach in 
understanding the economy is an outcome of the cen-
tral role uncertainty plays in this world view. Because 
of uncertainty, the accumulation of knowledge de-
pends on cross examination of theoretical positions 
that emanate from different perspectives and there-
fore are grounded in differently constituted views 
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of the world. This is the way theorists broaden their 
horizon and find new insights on the nature of social 
reality. Dow (1990, 1996, 2010) grounds the basis of 
this insight in ontological differences across schools 
of thought and in different conceptions of the mind. 
Part of the training of the economist is to “think how 
they think”32, and therefore become reflective of the 
whole process of theorising and its ontological and 
methodological underpinnings.
In conclusion, we can summarise this paper’s in-
terpretation of The General Theory in the following 
way. First, part of the classical analysis on produc-
tion interdependencies and consumption norms can 
be seen as useful devices in analysing the economy at 
every point in time and affect short run changes, de-
pending on what the objectives of the economist are. 
These heuristics of short period analysis and action 
are not a complete set of tools, but evolve through 
time as the economy changes. Second, the deeper key 
analytical insights of The General Theory are a com-
plex understanding of the individual that builds nar-
ratives about their environment and their place in the 
social order, and the inherent uncertainty these narra-
tives engender. Uncertainty defines not only the ac-
tions of the individuals, but also what the individuals 
32 Interview with Sheila Dow 13 July 2016 available at http://www.economicsppf.com/sheila-dow.html
understand of the world around them. In an effort to 
make sense of their complex environment individu-
als use shortcuts, and rely on established institutions, 
often, in the modern economy, markets and the price 
system. These market valuations are conventions 
and are perceived as such by market participants. 
The convention of the labour market stands separate 
exactly because through its pricing, the wage rate, it 
influences the relation of the individual with society. 
That is why it has such a prominent place in the world 
of The General Theory. Third, these insights both of 
heuristics to be used by economists to make sense 
of the world and of the deeper complex structure of 
modern capitalism constitute a particular viewpoint 
of what creates and sustains material civilization. At 
one end this viewpoint argues that aggregate demand 
has a role that is fundamental to material prosperi-
ty and its full conceptualisation is quite different to 
what classical and neoclassical analysis ascribe to it. 
At the other that the nature of modern capitalism and 
the uncertainty it brings forth both for the individual 
and for society at large necessitates new modes of 
thinking by the economist whose narratives and ac-
tion can help sustain the delicate social balance from 
dangers, both old and new. 
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